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MATTERING IN THE NETWORK SOCIETY 
Complete Research 
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Abstract  
While materiality is an important concept in IS research, there is little consensus as to how 
"materiality" ought to be understood. We find that the term is typically used, often implicitly, to mean 
"physicality" or the corporeal existence of objects. Grounded in a widely held "folk ontology" 
characteristic of modern Western thinking this view makes intuitive sense to us. It breaks down 
however when we consider typical entities of concern to IS researchers, such as software or 
information, or emerging phenomena in the network society, such as online social networks or virtual 
work. In response to unhelpful distinctions emerging from this view, such as between the “virtual” 
and “real” world, we put forward a relational view grounded in the emerging sociomateriality 
research orientation. This alternative position sees materiality not as a pre-given quality of entities 
but rather as an ongoing achievement of “mattering” situated in practice. We demonstrate with 
examples how this view enables IS researchers to grasp in more productive ways how materiality is 
achieved in an increasingly networked society.  
Keywords: Materiality, Sociomateriality, Relational Ontology, Network Society, Practice, Mattering. 
1 Introduction 
Materiality is the topic of much discussion in the IS community and is undergoing a renaissance across 
the social sciences (Pinch and Swedberg, 2008, Hodder, 2012, Leonardi et al., 2012, Carlile et al., 
2013a). Calls to renew the discipline’s interest in materiality come as a reaction to the recent history of 
organisation studies, which are said to have ‘traditionally overlooked the ways in which organizing is 
bound up with the material forms and spaces through which humans act and interact’ (Orlikowski, 
2007). Such an approach has been associated with extreme social constructivism, which Kallinikos et 
al. (2012) criticise for placing too much emphasis on human agency thus neglecting the consistencies 
of materiality across organisational contexts. This research essay contributes to this debate by consid-
ering how materiality is most usefully conceptualised.  
In a recent book, Leonardi et al. (2012) brought together IS and Organisation Studies scholars to dis-
cuss their views on this topic. Leonardi (2012) explains that there has been insufficient agreement on a 
definition for materiality and related terms, and that ‘without some definitional clarity, the terms re-
main jargon…instead of serving as useful tools for understanding and explaining the symbiotic pro-
cesses of technological and organizational change.’ We agree and argue that to gain clarity we must 
ensure that we bring to the fore existing ontological assumptions that inform the current use of materi-
ality and related terms. 
We live in a networked world infused with technology. Workplaces change as people work remotely 
with others, electronic forms of media have emerged as replacements for face-to-face communication, 
electronic files replace paper documents and software tools automate formerly manual tasks (Zuboff, 
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1988). Against this backdrop, the notion of materiality becomes an important device for studying the 
emerging networked (re)configurations of the entities making up these new organisational realities. 
Yet, we argue that the dominant understanding of materiality widely held in the field is unhelpful in 
grasping fully the nature and implications of these changes. We aim to demonstrate that the current, 
common-sense notion of materiality breaks down when aiming to make sense of everyday IS phenom-
ena, and that it creates unhelpful distinctions that act as distractions which cover up more than they 
reveal. The question at the heart of our enquiry is: Does an entity “have” materiality, or is materiality 
an accomplishment? And by extension, how do these two distinct ways of thinking about materiality 
limit or further IS research relevant to the network society?  
A common-sense response to the first question is that an entity (object, person, tool) “has” material 
properties that are intrinsic to it. This response represents a substantialist ontology, which holds that 
“matter” refers to the physical “stuff” that the object is made of. In other words, materiality is that 
which persists over time and doesn’t ‘go away’ ‘when everyone packs up their bags and goes home at 
the end of the day’ (Leonardi, 2012). Hence, materiality is equated with physicality. The entity “has 
matter”, it exists because it “is there”, can be seen, touched, interacted with “in real life”. In other 
words, if an entity has corporeal presence, it is material, if it doesn’t, then it is not. This view makes 
intuitive sense, because it is grounded in a deeply held rational scientific worldview that permeates 
modern Western thinking  (Spinosa et al., 1997). Yet, in IS this notion of materiality is problematic. 
Take as an example the calculator application on your smartphone. Would the app qualify as material 
under the above substantialist definition? Its buttons are made of light and are called into being only 
by pressing on glass. It just as quickly disappears from view. Does it still “exist” when it lies dormant? 
The calculator app certainly depends on physical phenomena (such as light and electricity), but does it 
have the same materiality as a “real calculator”, or as pen and paper or an old-fashioned wooden 
counting device? Intuitively we would say that they differ – that software is somehow different from 
“real” entities. But is software therefore less real? Are the virtual worlds created on the Internet less 
real than the “real world”? And as IS scholars wouldn’t we also equally intuitively qualify the calcula-
tor app, the Internet and virtual worlds as material, despite their ambiguous relationship to physicality?  
In the following we explore the common-sense substantialist position on materiality and consider the 
consequences of this view for IS research. We then introduce a contrasting view grounded in a differ-
ent, relational ontology, which sees materiality as co-constitutively entangled with the social aspects 
of practice. In doing so, we locate this alternative view in the recently emerging sociomateriality re-
search orientation, and in particular in Butler’s (1999) seminal discussion of Bodies that Matter, in 
which she defines matter as: ‘that which matters about an object’. We adapt Butler’s words in propos-
ing that IS research can better grasp the phenomena of the network society by adopting a view which 
holds that that which matters about an entity is its materiality. 
This relational view sees materiality as an ongoing accomplishment situated within practice (Nicolini, 
2012). This view allows us to effectively divorce the notion of materiality from physicality. We then 
demonstrate how this cleavage opens up a productive space for IS research by emphasising that there 
is indeed a relationship between materiality and physicality, and that this relationship is complex, rele-
vant and interesting, but can only be investigated when materiality and physicality are not conflated. 
We begin by motivating the important role of materiality in understanding networked phenomena. We 
then engage with the etymology of materiality and contrast the substantialist with a relational, socio-
material understanding, before we draw on four example vignettes to illustrate how the two different 
views illuminate IS phenomena in different ways. This will lead us to argue that a relational view is 
more appropriate for grasping the emerging IS phenomena characterising the network society. 
2 Rethinking IS concepts in the Network Society 
According to Manuel Castells (2007b), in the ‘digital age’ networks extend across ‘all domains of so-
cial life’. ‘The network society’ (Castells, 2011) is the result of two related phenomena: communica-
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tion technologies and communication itself. Communication technologies such as mobile phones facil-
itate communication between people who are brought together through this communication in com-
plex networks. Castells (2007a) captures some of the contradictions inherent in these pervasive com-
munication networks, which are ‘at the same time global and local, generic and customized in an ever-
changing pattern’. Such contradictions are very familiar to us in everyday practice, for example we 
can attend a local conference while we simultaneously interact via Twitter with an ever-changing 
global community. In this example the communication network is simultaneously global and local, 
generic (the conference format) and customised (in our use of Twitter). 
While being technologically connected is commonplace in the network society, it is nevertheless diffi-
cult to describe and theorise such global/local practices in IS research. From a theoretical perspective 
the network society is marked by complexities that conventional analytical categories have difficulty 
grasping. Our connectedness requires us to rethink concepts in IS research that have traditionally been 
thought of as oppositional, in particular the categories of near and far, present and absent, or real and 
virtual. Much IS research and practice is concerned with these traditional dichotomies. 
But what relevance do they hold today? And how do our traditional understandings of these categories 
help or hinder us in conducting relevant, interesting and useful IS research? In the network society, 
pedestrians distracted by far away friends risk road collisions; advertisers struggle to reach viewers 
who engage with multiple screens at once; University campuses fight for relevance as students browse 
digital readings and access lectures online; and wars are waged using devices such as drones and com-
puter worms that can be controlled or let loose at a distance yet enact devastating local effects. We 
argue that before the discipline is able to assess the outcomes of the network society as dystopic or 
utopic, our first task will require a sharpening of our analytical tools so that we can better grasp, de-
scribe, and understand the phenomena relevant to IS in this new era. 
Against this backdrop, we argue that materiality emerges as a crucial concept in helping us to under-
stand and overcome distinctions that reveal themselves to be incongruous to the network society. For 
example what is far and near in a globally connected world? I can be physically crammed in a train 
carriage full of people but feel closer to a friend in another country whose Facebook message I am 
reading on my smartphone. What counts as virtual and what is real in a society where experience and 
relationships are heavily mediated by technology? What does it mean to be present or absent in remote 
working environments? We enlist a relational understanding of the concept of materiality to enable us 
to come to terms with these tensions. We aim to demonstrate how the term materiality has come to be 
implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, associated with corporeal presence, that is with physicality. This 
association in turn is tied to a belief that things that are physical and that are close enough to touch are 
in some ways more “real”. A contribution of the paper is therefore to show that how we conceptualise 
materiality has implications for how we conceive of distance, virtuality, and presence, concepts central 
to our understanding of networked phenomena.  
3 What is materiality? 
In this section we first locate our argument in the recently renewed debate about the importance of 
materiality for IS research. In order to then shape our understanding of materiality, in the second sub 
section we will unearth the etymology of the term before we contrast the dominant, everyday notion, 
termed the substantialist view, with an alternative relational view, which we formulate on the back-
ground of the emerging research orientation of sociomateriality. We note that this second view is ‘al-
ternative’ only in that it is less prominent. Both views have long histories, as we will show. 
3.1 Renewed interest in materiality in IS research 
Leonardi et al.’s 2012 book allows us to canvas IS scholars’ responses to the question: What is materi-
ality? These responses illustrate the difficulty of delineating materiality from physicality. Leonardi 
(2012) for example draws on the work of Faulkner and Runde (2011) and others in proposing that ma-
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teriality is ‘the arrangement of an artefact’s physical and/or digital materials into particular forms that 
endure across differences in place and time and are important to users.’ This catchall definition invites 
further questioning – what, for example, is the “material” alluded to here, and what is the difference 
between physical and digital material? And why does it have to be important to the user?  
Similarly, Faulkner and Runde (2012) argue for ‘the word “material” to refer to the physicality of enti-
ties’. This subsequently requires an explanation of ‘non-material technological objects’, which they 
define as ‘those that do not have a physical mode of being such as computer programs, search algo-
rithms, technical standards and protocols, and so on (Faulkner and Runde, 2011)’. Under this defini-
tion typical IT artefacts such as software do not have physical existence and therefore are not material. 
Accordingly, Yoo (2012) argues that ‘digital technology is immaterial’ because, as a string of bits, 
they do not ‘have tactile existence on their own’.  
The problematic consequences of this view are acknowledged by Pentland and Singh (2012), who 
point out that ‘nonmaterial artifacts have had enormous practical consequences, but there is no-thing 
there…these examples [therefore] challenge our intuition about ideas such as materiality and artifact’. 
In search of a resolution to this challenge, Pentland and Singh (2012) are inspired by pragmatist phi-
losophy to look at how financial auditors make sense of materiality in practice. They discover that for 
the auditors, how material something is depends on how much it matters to the situation and action at 
hand. Pentland and Singh (2012) surmise that ‘materiality is not about artifacts, people, ideas, or any 
thing…it is about all of them, but they only become material when they influence a particular course 
of actions or events that we value. Materiality is all about actions, values, and consequences in con-
text’ (Pentland and Singh, 2012). 
In just this one book the diversity of definitions and attitudes towards materiality are on display. It be-
comes obvious that some of these views are incommensurable, and yet the words materiality, material 
and matter are often used without qualification in IS research. When a definition is provided, it is not 
always clear. Take for example the following, from Leonardi (2012): 
To be clear, “materiality” does not refer solely to the materials out of which a technology is created 
and it is not a synonym with “physicality.” Instead, when we say that we are focusing on a technolo-
gy’s materiality, we are referring to the ways that its physical and/or digital materials are arranged into 
particular forms that endure across differences in place and time. Such a definition suggests that the 
usefulness of the term “materiality” is that it identifies those constituent features of a technology that 
are (in theory) available to all users in the same way. 
According to this definition there are two aspects to materiality. Firstly, technology (as an example) 
has materiality. Secondly, materiality is a rhetorical device that allows us to talk about a technology’s 
physical or digital “materials” which do not change over time or in different contexts. The caveat ‘in 
theory’ is important because it separates the definition of materiality from action, from practice. The 
inference in this definition is that what is material stays the same, during or in spite of changes in the 
social aspects of context. Materiality in this definition is therefore largely separate from individual or 
social contingencies and is grounded instead in endurance of physicality and form, despite the early 
disclaimer. 
The question now is: does this lack of clarity or consensus on the definition of materiality matter? It is 
not our concern here to present one view as more “correct” than the other, however we borrow from 
Pentland and Singh (2012) in taking a pragmatic approach. We spell out firstly what grounds these 
views and secondly ascertain how each affords us a different view of IS phenomena, with particular 
emphasis on how these distinctions are relevant to researching the network society. To this end we 
now offer an overview of the etymological legacy of materiality and matter as its associated concept. 
3.2 Materiality: an etymology  
The term materiality and its root matter have long and varied histories. These histories are introduced 
here in order to shed light on how two different perspectives on materiality have emerged over time. 
The first perspective is based on substantialist ontology and associates materiality with physicality and 
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corporeality, in that materiality is a physical property of an entity that is durable over time. The second 
perspective is based on a relational ontology and views materiality as an active accomplishment that 
emerges in practice. We first introduce the etymological origins of these two views before briefly 
showing that the relational view, while in many respects the elder of the two, emerges only more re-
cently in a range of contemporary academic literature.  
The word matter derives from the Anglo-French matere which comes from the Latin materia meaning 
‘substance from which something is made’ (Gentile, 2014). Other links include the Latin word mater 
which means ‘origin, source, mother’, and a reference grounded in the Greek word hyle meaning the 
‘hard inner wood of a tree’ from which other entities are made (Butler, 1999, Gentile, 2014). Butler 
(1999) notes that these original meanings imply temporalisation – for Aristotle, for example, matter is 
equated with ‘potentiality’, [dynameos]; similarly hyle refers to wood that has been cut from trees but 
is ‘on the way to being put to use’ and materia is defined by having the potential to be made into 
something. Implicit in these early usages is a sense of teleology, of emergence and transformation. We 
note that matter was originally associated strongly with change, not persistence. 
It was in the mid-14th century (a period marked in Europe by the Hundred Years War and the Black 
Death) that matter came to be associated with the ‘substance of which physical objects are made’ 
(Gentile, 2014). At around the same time, the meaning of the word shifted to include ‘grounds, reason, 
or cause for something’ (Gentile, 2014), as in the phrase ‘a matter for serious thought’. In the mid-15th 
Century another level of abstraction was introduced and the phrase ‘what is the matter?’ was first rec-
orded, followed by the verb usage ‘to matter’, which is still used today to mean ‘to be of importance or 
consequence’ (Gentile, 2014). 
Implicit in these varied etymological roots and associated meanings are two distinct ontological posi-
tions. The first is the substantialist view, which defines matter as the ‘substance of which physical ob-
jects are made’ (Gentile, 2014). In this view, an object has materiality, and its materiality can be un-
derstood through physical examination. The second is the relational view, which acknowledges the 
networked relationship between entities implied in some sense in the early definition of materia as 
‘substance from which something is made’ and furthered by the verb form, meaning ‘to be of im-
portance of consequence’. The difference between ‘of which’ and ‘from which’ here is important. The 
latter definition requires that matter and by association materiality is always understood in relation to 
other entities in practice. The wood or hyle that has been cut from trees matters because it is on its way 
to being made into a house or a ship, it matters precisely because it holds a networked relationship in a 
particular practice. 
From this brief etymology we can see that over time two ontological positions have emerged that un-
derpin the notion of matter and that both derive from a rich historical tradition. The implications of 
both positions for IS scholarship and practice are now explored. 
3.3 The Substantialist View of Materiality 
In a substantialist ontology, materiality is viewed as ‘intrinsic’ to a technology (Leonardi, 2012). In 
this commonly held view, materiality is often associated with “the real, material, world” (see for 
example the usage of the term in Howard-Grenville and Carlile, 2006). We suggest that this substan-
tialist view of materiality links strongly with the notion of “physical objects”, and that therefore in this 
view, materiality is attributed to those aspects of an entity that can be observed, measured, and often, 
touched. We find two problems with this view for IS research. Firstly, this view suggests that material-
ity is fixed, unchanging, and separate from human activity. Secondly, it preferences the physical at the 
expense of considering the ways in which entities without corporeal presence play a very real and con-
sequential part in IS and organisational phenomena. 
The substantialist understanding of materiality is deeply engrained in contemporary Western thinking 
and stems from a worldview that forms the basis of the rational scientific attitude that has dominated 
Western thought since the enlightenment (Spinosa et al., 1997). It has its early roots in Greek 
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philosophy. Under this view, what it means to be is a matter of physical existence, or as King (2001) 
puts it, ‘when Greek-Western philosophy speaks of to be, it thinks of the is of a thing’ (emphasis 
added). Today this view constitutes a powerful folk ontology. Because we grow up immersed in this 
understanding, it appears self-evident. At the same time however, this view has largely crowded out 
any other way of understanding the world. Due to its ubiquity, this substantialist ontology tends to be 
largely invisible and thus difficult to challenge (Spinosa et al., 1997). 
3.4 A relational view of materiality and “mattering” 
The relational perspective that we bring to the fore in this paper conceives of materiality as an active 
accomplishment, in that materialisation is a becoming that is achieved in a context of intelligibility. 
This means that under this view materiality is a) not a given, but b) is relational, in that mattering de-
pends on relationships between entities in the context of practice. It posits that the very notion of “an 
entity” requires that there is already some socially agreed distinction being made in practice, for ex-
ample: a hammer might be made from wood and steel in a certain way to afford pounding, but it is its 
relationship with nails, the activity of hammering and carpentry practice more generally that renders it 
a hammer in the first place (Heidegger, 1962). 
The relational ontology has a long lineage, more recently informed by how the notion of mattering is 
interpreted by feminist and post-humanist theorists, such as Butler, Harraway, and Barad, and by 
scholars in disciplines such as sociology, psychoanalysis, and psychology. Feminist theorists have 
held a particular interest in working through and beyond the notion that mattering is intrinsic to or de-
termined by physical form. It is important in their theorisation that the capacity to be consequential is 
not dependent on the physical biology of the human body, nor are the ways in which things matter 
self-evident extrapolations of their physical existence. This is summarised by Butler (1999) when she 
explains the thinking behind her book’s title Bodies that Matter: 
To speak within these classical contexts of bodies that matter is not an idle pun, for to be material 
means to materialize, where the principle of that materialization is precisely what “matters” about 
that body, its very intelligibility. In this sense, to know the significance of something is to know how 
and why it matters, where “to matter” means at once “to materialize” and “to mean”. 
Butler (1999) here builds on ancient Greek notions of materiality and signification to coin the phrase 
‘that which matters about an object is its matter’, which we adapt to that which matters about an entity 
is its materiality.  
We embrace the word entity here, in line with the work of Latour (2005) and the influential A Cyborg 
Manifesto, in which Harraway (1991) proposed the notion of the cyborg as an emancipatory figure that 
is not defined by being man or woman, human or non-human, but rather is defined as an entity in prac-
tice, through action. Similarly, Barad (2003) explains that this ‘move toward performative alternatives 
to representationalism’ is not about tying materiality to language and other systems of representation; 
rather, a relational, performative approach is beneficial because it ‘shifts the focus from questions of 
correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g., do they mirror nature or culture?) to matters of 
practices/doings/actions.’ We take care to point out that this view of materiality is not to be conflated 
with the endless “relativity” associated with postmodern views of subjectivity. Rather, we emphasise 
the way in which social agreement in the form of practice solidifies certain boundaries over time, in a 
process of materialisation.  
Sociologists and psychologists have drawn on this relational view in work on social inclusion. 
Rosenberg and McCullough (1981) theorised that ‘mattering refers to the individual’s feeling that he 
or she counts, makes a difference’, which always stands in relation to some activity or context. They 
explain the importance of this concept in understanding transition periods in life such as retirement, 
where it is common to feel that ‘one no longer matters; others no longer depend on us’ (Rosenberg and 
McCullough, 1981). The importance of mattering during transitional periods was developed by 
Schlossberg (1989) who studied college students’ experience in terms of ‘mattering’ and ‘marginali-
ty’. She theorised that ‘mattering is the experience of others depending on us, being interested in us, 
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and being concerned with our fate; while the experience of marginality results in opposite feelings—
the feeling of not fitting in and not being needed or accepted’ (Schlossberg, 1989, Rayle and Chung, 
2007). 
In IS and Organisation Studies Orlikowski (2007, 2009) and Orlikowski and Scott (2008) have more 
recently introduced the perspective of sociomateriality. In reaction to both technological determinist 
and human-focused approaches, Orlikowski (2010) calls for our rethinking of ‘the capability to posit 
and theorise the material effects of technological artifacts’. In response, sociomateriality, ‘focuses on 
how meanings and materialities are enacted together in everyday practices’ (Orlikowski, 2010). Soci-
omateriality is underpinned by a relational ontology in which ‘entities, human beings, and things exist 
only in relations: they are performed and continuously brought into being through relations (Latour, 
2005, Orlikowski, 2010)’ (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 2014). The view of materiality that we put for-
ward in this paper is in line with this perspective. We additionally note that our analysis of a relational 
view of materiality should not be taken as breaking with the ontological inseparability postulated by 
sociomateriality, as this position does not mean that one cannot analyse specific parts of sociomaterial 
practices (such as their materiality), but that any parts are co-constituted ontologically through their 
relation to other parts. 
We have provided this inter-disciplinary account of matter, mattering, and materiality to demonstrate 
that the meanings of these words have a history and must not be taken for granted. We come to under-
stand materiality as an ongoing, active accomplishment against a background of social meaning that is 
re-enacted over time. At the same time we do not deny the existence of a physical world – quite the 
opposite. We acknowledge that physicality is important to the materiality of many entities, but advo-
cate to keep the two concepts separate precisely to be able to understand their interplay.  
4 Two views of materiality: illuminating IS phenomena 
In this section we illustrate with four case vignettes how the two ontological positions of materiality 
differ. The phenomena captured in these vignettes were chosen for their capacity to highlight key dif-
ferences and have been taken from everyday experiences and recent research. The vignettes are neces-
sarily stylised and the analyses brief so as to illustrate a typical response in each case.  
4.1 The many faces of a calculator 
On a Chinese flee market a Western tourist is interested in buying a hat. The tourist points to the hat 
and asks for a price. The trader pulls out a plastic calculator and types in her price, displaying it to 
the tourist. The tourist, knowing the exchange rate but too tired to do the sum, unlocks his smartphone 
and taps to bring the phone’s calculator app into view. He puts the trader’s price into the app, but the 
result is more than he wants to pay. The tourist enters a lower number and presents the smartphone 
screen to the trader, who shakes her head and returns to her calculator. After several turns of this they 
agree on a price and the sale takes place.  
There are two kinds of calculator involved in this vignette. One is made of plastic and is limited in 
what it is able to do. The other is an app that has the same functionality, but disappears easily in order 
to make room for other applications such as a camera or music player. We intuitively recognise the 
plastic calculator as having corporeal existence, but the smartphone calculator app is fluid and can take 
several forms. The plastic calculator we can readily point to as physical, but the calculator app’s phys-
icality is much harder to pin down. The calculator app does not change often in appearance, but like all 
software it undergoes periodic transformations, mostly invisible, when the phone’s operating system 
updates.  
If we approach the scenario from the substantialist view that thinks of materiality as ‘that which stays 
the same over time’ (Leonardi, 2012) and presents itself uniformly in different contexts, the plastic 
calculator in our vignette would be deemed material, while the calculator app’s materiality is ambigu-
ous. Yet in our scenario the trader does not even use her calculator to calculate, she uses it to com-
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municate her price and to cross a language barrier. The smartphone too has a certain physical exist-
ence as an object; it is made from metal, glass and plastic - when it runs out of battery or if the soft-
ware is fatally corrupted, it could be called a ‘brick’. And yet in our vignette, the smartphone is a cal-
culator, enlisted in practice as a calculation and communication and translation device. Where do we 
situate the smartphone calculator app’s materiality then? From the substantialist view we may associ-
ate the app’s materiality with the shape and size of the smartphone, or conclude that the app is digital, 
and therefore “immaterial”, or “non-physical”, even though it matters very much in this practice of 
trade.   
Rather than trying to pin down and categorise each device according to its unchanging intrinsic prop-
erties (Weber, 2012), we argue it is more useful to IS research to consider the materiality of these de-
vices as an active accomplishment. The vignette highlights how, from a relational view, physical and 
digital entities both are able to accomplish materiality in practice. 
Although in the above scenario the plastic calculator and the smartphone calculator app are materially 
similar (they matter in much the same way) this is not always the case. For example, the practice of 
sitting a maths exam would treat the two devices very differently. The plastic calculator harmonises 
with the convention of sitting a maths exam and the good student can confidently place their plastic 
calculator on their desk. The smartphone, however, with its capacity to photograph, research and 
communicate, is immediately removed from the students’ desk for being transgressive to exam prac-
tice. Similarly, in our vignette the plastic calculator may be preferable in the trader’s practice precisely 
because it is not a phone, because the plastic calculator’s materiality as a translation and negotiation 
tool is not threatened by other materialisations such as interruptions from a phone call or personal text 
message. 
4.2 Demetrifying the Facebook ‘Like’ Button 
The social networking platform Facebook includes a number of features that collect and display met-
rics. The “Like” button is the most well-known of these. It is a “thumbs up” icon that is clicked on by 
users, most often to show approval or just that the post has been seen. A metric next to the “Like” but-
ton displays the collective number of likes that the post has received. In 2012, as a protest against 
such quantification in a social arena, the artist Benjamin Grosser created a web browser extension 
called “Facebook Demetricator”. In the artist’s words: ‘Facebook Demetricator is a free and open 
source web browser extension that removes all metrics from the Facebook interface. Friend counts 
disappear. “Like” quantifications vanish. Shares are no longer enumerated’ (Grosser, 2014). Since 
2012 Demetricator has been used and discussed by thousands of users internationally (Dewey, 2014). 
What is the materiality of the “Like” button on Facebook, and how should it be studied by IS re-
searchers? The substantialist view would consider it to be a “feature” of Facebook. The implication is 
that this feature offers users functionality – a user has the option of clicking or not clicking on the Like 
button. It is generally assumed that the purpose of the Like button is to show approval, agreement, or 
recognition towards the attached post. Studies grounded in the substantialist view might investigate 
how often and in which circumstances this button is clicked. Introducing the Facebook Demetricator 
however raises an interesting problem. The little counter next to the feature is taken away, but the fea-
ture remains the same, it can still be clicked or not clicked – its neighbouring metric function has been 
erased, but the same options are essentially still available to the user. How does this change the mate-
riality of Facebook and of the Like button itself? Is it simply that a feature is deactivated? 
This take would not explain Grosser’s project, or rather what the artist reacted against. The artist’s 
ambition to ‘demetrify’ Facebook was about more than reducing its functionality. He targeted Face-
book as a practice, which he argues revolves too much around competitive quantification of approval. 
By taking away all metrics, and most notably those associated with the Like button, from the Face-
book experience, he found that people were not only using the platform quite differently, the entire 
experience changed. A Washington Post journalist described their experience of this change as fol-
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lows: ‘I was immune to viral posts, to Facebook peer-pressure, to acutely targeted ads. Only I deter-
mined what I clicked, and oddly, in that vacuum, I clicked almost nothing’ (Dewey, 2014). 
When the numbers associated with the Like button are erased, the practice of ‘Facebooking’ changes; 
using Facebook feels different, the tone and mood of communication changes. Our point here is that 
what might be interpreted under the substantialist view as a material change to Facebook regarding the 
displaying of metric information, the demetrification actually brings to the fore the materiality of the 
Like button as we experience it conventionally. The materiality of the Like button is holistic/systemic, 
it is implicated in the entire practice, activities and behaviours of Facebook users. When the numerical 
result generated by the button is taken away, the materiality of Facebook as a whole is changed. The 
relational view highlights how practices shift after demetrification, and how the Like button itself will 
subsequently be materially different – because it matters in different ways within the practice. 
4.3 Stuxnet: ‘The world’s first digital weapon’ 
Stuxnet is a sophisticated computer worm that emerged in 2010 specifically targeting a uranium en-
richment facility in Natanz, Iran, with the apparent goal of disrupting the Iranian nuclear program. A 
computer worm is different from a computer virus: ‘while a computer virus relies on an unwitting vic-
tim to install it, a worm spreads on its own, often over a computer network’ (Kushner, 2013). Stuxnet 
was heralded as the ‘world’s first digital weapon’ because it was used ‘to physically destroy a military 
target – not just metaphorically, but literally’ (Langner, 2011). Stuxnet was not aimed at ‘the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability of information’ as such programs usually are, rather it was aimed 
at manipulating controllers involved in a ‘physical production process’ (Langner, 2011). Specifically, 
Stuxnet was designed to target controllers only from the manufacturer Siemens. The virus successfully 
found a target in Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment plant. Its ‘dropper loaded rogue code to the con-
troller’ - and stayed quiet while the ‘legitimate code…continued to be executed’ (Langner, 2011).  
Kushner (2013) describes the worm’s attack as follows: ‘This worm was an unprecedentedly masterful 
and malicious piece of code that attacked in three phases. First, it targeted Microsoft Windows ma-
chines and networks, repeatedly replicating itself. Then it sought out Siemens Step7 software, which is 
also Windows-based and used to program industrial control systems that operate equipment, such as 
centrifuges. Finally, it compromised the programmable logic controllers. The worm’s authors could 
thus spy on the industrial systems and even cause the fast-spinning centrifuges to tear themselves 
apart, unbeknownst to the human operators at the plant. (Iran has not confirmed reports that Stuxnet 
destroyed some of its centrifuges.)’ (Kushner, 2013).  
One of the reasons that ‘the world’s first digital weapon’ (Zetter, 2014b) so astounded people was be-
cause it produced physical consequences. In Langer’s initial description above he emphasises that the 
effects of Stuxnet were not just ‘metaphorical’, occurring in the realm of ‘information’, but “literal” in 
that it impacted machinery physically. This sentiment is asserted even more strongly by Kim Zetter, 
the author of a book on Stuxnet (2014a), who explains the worm’s novelty as follows: ‘rather than 
simply hijacking targeted computers or stealing information from them, it escaped the digital realm to 
wreak physical destruction on equipment the computers controlled’ (Zetter, 2014b). 
What does all of this tell us about the materiality of Stuxnet? Stuxnet has no corporeal presence, yet it 
escaped the ‘digital realm’ to destroy mechanical entities that do. Stuxnet therefore poses a problem 
for conventional ways of thinking because despite its lack of corporeality it has transgressed a bounda-
ry carefully erected and maintained in theory and practice between the virtual/digital and the physi-
cal/real. The above vignette thus brings to the fore how a separation between the ephemeral and the 
physical realm has a strong tradition in Western thought, harking back to the Kantian supposition that 
the mind and body are fundamentally different. This substantialist view draws from a tradition where 
an entity is either corporeal or spiritual, and is supposed not to be able to travel between the two 
realms or have the capacity to directly impact the realm it does not belong to. 
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Stuxnet was and is a perplexing and complex phenomenon. Yet, because of its transgressive ways, it 
presents a particular challenge to IS research grounded in a substantialist view. An autonomous digital 
entity having an effect on the physical world is problematic under the definition of materiality as “hav-
ing corporeal existence” and being “that which stays the same”. Is Stuxnet, in its digital, sophisticated, 
elusive, and adaptable configurations, material? The relational view would say, of course. This view 
would consider Stuxnet’s materiality as an active accomplishment in the context of practice. In the 
context of Siemens Step7 software and the practice of Uranium production in Iran, Stuxnet has and 
does matter a great deal. The materiality of Stuxnet is therefore relational to the entities with which it 
is tied and is achieved over time in action. The problem of whether and how the digital is able to im-
pact the material (or better: physical) recedes when we think of Stuxnet in terms of relational material-
ity, in how it comes to matter in the context of practice. This opens a space to consider in which ways 
the materiality of Stuxnet is an achievement of the interplay between digital and physical entities. 
4.4 Remote Workers: Called back to the office 
In 2013 the CEO of Yahoo! Marissa Mayer recalled all her remote-working employees back to the 
office, explaining to her staff that creativity and collegiality happen through interaction in office cor-
ridors and around water coolers. A memo was sent to staff that read ‘We need to be one Yahoo! That 
starts with physically being together’ (Keller, 2013). The New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg came 
out in support of Mayer, calling remote work ‘one of the dumber ideas I’ve ever heard’ (Daily Mail 
Reporter, 2013). Richard Branson had a different perspective, deeming Mayer and Bloomberg’s views 
a sign of ‘old school thinking’ and predicting that ‘In 30 years’ time, as technology moves forward 
even further, people are going to look back and wonder why offices ever existed’ (Branson, 2013). 
Remote working has been the topic of much debate. The Yahoo! example is often cited as a motiva-
tion for the inquiry: does remote working work? In the vignette we see two drastically opposing re-
sponses to this question from two successful CEOs. There are of course practical logistical issues to 
consider when setting up remote working arrangements, however there are also deeper issues at play 
here. In Mayer’s memo for example, being a cohesive organisation is explicitly equated with being 
physically co-located. Branson on the other hand can imagine a future in which offices, the stand-in 
for physical co-location, become unintelligible. This conflict can be understood in the context of the 
two perspectives on materiality. It is not our intention to take sides in the above debate, but rather to 
use this scenario to illustrate how the two perspectives allow grasping the remote work phenomenon 
differently. 
Under the substantialist view a remote worker is defined by being corporeally distant (in a Cartesian 
sense) from the organisation’s central point or hub – the “head office”. This distance cannot be fully 
overcome by digital means because there is a “material reality” to the distance between the remote 
worker and their manager at the head office. The remote worker is, due to their lack of physical co-
location, not “materially present” in the organisation. They can try and overcome this by communi-
cating often and doing their work effectively, but it is always a hurdle that is best overcome by bring-
ing the remote worker physically back into the hallways and meeting rooms of the “real” physical of-
fice. This view is associated with the problem of “presenteeism”, where employees feel they need to 
put in “face time” at the office even if they are unwell or unproductive (see Johns, 2010). The assump-
tion that being corporeally present is “better” cuts both ways – remote workers are defined by their 
absence, while it is (often falsely) assumed that “showing up” is vital to, or even all that is required for 
an employee to matter in the organisational context. 
On the other hand, a relational view allows us to grasp the remote working scenario differently. If the 
remote worker’s materiality is thought of as how they matter in the context of practice vis-à-vis shared 
social activity, then a remote worker can be very much material in the organisation even while they are 
corporeally present elsewhere. Provided that the organisation’s work practices are accommodating of 
the ways in which a remote worker can accomplish materiality. For example, if the organisational 
norm is to make decisions in the kitchenette over tea and biscuits then the remote worker is unlikely to 
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accomplish materiality in the context of this decision-making practice (it is difficult to teleconference 
to a kitchenette). Equally, if the organisation’s work practices revolve around the physical arrange-
ment of desks, partitions, board room tables and water coolers, it will be very difficult for the remote 
worker to matter. 
If organisational practices are however changed to accommodate remote workers, communal corporeal 
presence need no longer be the only way in which organisational members can contribute to the organ-
ising process. While there will always be a role for co-located interaction that might not be replaced by 
technology, managers are starting to reimagine what it means to be material in the organisation. For 
example, organisations dedicated to the practice of Working Out Loud (Aten et al., 2014), where deci-
sions are continually discussed and recorded on Enterprise Social Networking platforms, allow a re-
mote worker every chance of contributing to the decision making process. If the remote worker is 
meaningfully involved in the organising practice then they can accomplish materiality – they can ma-
terialise – from wherever they happen to be. 
5 Discussion: what’s the difference, then? 
We have outlined the importance of materiality for the study of IS phenomena in the network society 
and distinguished two views grounded in very different ontologies, one substantialist and one relation-
al, which we illustrated with four case vignettes. In this section we now highlight selected examples of 
IS writing in order to discuss the implications of these ontological groundings for IS research.  
Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. (2014) in line with Carlile et al. (2013b), Emirbayer (1997) and Introna 
(2013), have argued that the substantialist ontology is the dominant position in IS and management 
research. We too find evidence for the prevalence of this position. Importantly, those scholars writing 
from a substantialist ontological viewpoint often do so implicitly, without mention of the possibility of 
an alternative approach. This is in keeping with a dominant worldview held more widely in society, 
which renders it unnecessary to articulate or even be aware of that which is already taken-for-granted.  
5.1 Illustration of differences with an IS research example 
We now want to outline the ways in which the relational notion of materiality comes to make a differ-
ence. For illustration purposes, we draw on an IS study by Howard-Grenville and Carlile (2006) ‘The 
incompatibility of knowledge regimes: consequences of the material world for cross-domain work’. In 
this study the authors conduct a case study of knowledge integration in the context of two groups in-
volved in semiconductor manufacturing. The authors claim that the work practices of the groups under 
investigation are ‘structured by the material world and broader collective conventions’ (Howard-
Grenville and Carlile, 2006). 
The phrase ‘material reality’ is used in the paper as a proxy for the physical context of semiconductor 
manufacturing. In trying to separate out the ‘material level’, the ‘work practice level’ and the ‘industry 
convention level’, the authors quickly come across difficulties because the ‘EnviroTech’ manufactur-
ing group and the traditional ‘Tech’ group see the ‘material reality’ of the environment differently. The 
authors explain this incongruence by pointing out that ‘environmental problems are not easily divisi-
ble’ because ‘materials do not simply go away…they get transferred between media – from air, to wa-
ter, to land, and vice versa – or assume different forms that may have different effects’ (Howard-
Grenville and Carlile, 2006). 
Such a qualification points to the futility of associating materiality with an un-changing, physical ‘re-
ality’. Howard-Grenville and Carlile (2006) to an extent acknowledge this when they summarise a sec-
tion on the ‘material level’ of semiconductor manufacturing by concluding that ‘the material world 
relevant to the environmental specialists presents constraints, as it does to those within Tech. But the 
constraints are almost never predictable, and past successes do not scale to enable future ones.’ This 
research shows that the notion of ‘material reality’ is not easily conflated with that of the ‘physical 
environment’ because how the environment matters to each group depends on their practices and their 
Hafermalz & Riemer / Mattering in the Network Society 
 
 
Twenty-Third European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Münster, Germany, 2015 12 
 
 
concerns. A shift in perspective to a relational view would enable the study of materiality as enacted 
by and relevant to the stakeholders in the case thereby allowing the IS researcher to unearth the role of 
materiality in the unfolding of the phenomenon under study. 
5.2 Overcoming the conflation of physical and material 
We argue that to grasp IS phenomena in a network society we need to move away from the notion that 
physicality is the “gold standard” for materiality. This we believe will open up new areas for meaning-
ful inquiry. A digital algorithm can inform decisions and bring people together. An idea can galvanise. 
A computer worm can disable millions of dollars’ worth of physical equipment in a faraway location. 
Who we feel close to is not determined by physical proximity.  
We do not claim or attempt to solve how the world “really” is, nor do we argue that the physical exist-
ence of entities does not matter. Rather we offer an alternative view against which the equation of 
physical with material as well as the various unproductive distinctions it creates, such as virtual/real, 
near/far, can be tackled. In doing so, we follow others who have sought to put entities such as people, 
objects, and ideas on an equal footing, and we argue that all can come to be material, and to matter, in 
practice; and that materiality is always a social accomplishment. 
At the same time this view does not deny physicality; quite the opposite, it allows us to take physicali-
ty seriously. Only if we do not conflate the two are we able to study the role of physicality in the ac-
complishment of materiality, and vice-versa. This is particularly important for a discipline that studies 
the material changes brought about by the wide-ranging digitisation of activities, content, communica-
tion, etc.; in other words: changes in the role of physicality. 
Consequently, a relational view of materiality opens a number of productive research avenues. Firstly, 
it allows us to study how the replacement of physical entities with digital ones changes materiality in 
practice. One of the most prominent examples is the change that the music industry has experienced 
brought about by the replacement of physical music media with digital music consumption. Secondly, 
it allows grasping how entities that have a physical role in practice lose their materiality over time. For 
example a Firewire cable no longer matters in computing practice and so the cable and the devices it 
connects are discarded and decay or are recycled. Thirdly, it allows studying the opposite phenome-
non, how entities can change their physical make-up over time, but sustain their materiality. For ex-
ample, the hammers of today share little of their physical construction with the hammers that our 
grandparents would have used, but their materiality in hammering practice remains largely unchanged. 
6 Conclusion 
Materiality is an important concept for IS researchers. Yet we have argued that materiality is common-
ly understood, explicitly or implicitly, in terms of the corporeal existence of entities, that is their phys-
icality. This substantialist view makes intuitive sense to us, as it is grounded in a widely held 
worldview characteristic of modern Western thinking. At the same time we have argued that this view 
leads to a number of distinctions and contradictions that are unhelpful for the study of IS phenomena 
in a society that is increasingly infused with technology.  
As an alternative, we have outlined a relational view of materiality and demonstrated with a number of 
examples that this view is more useful in addressing diverse IS phenomena in the network society. We 
suggest that operating from a view that equates materiality with physicality will lead us down less 
fruitful paths than if we think of materiality as that which matters about an entity in practice. For ex-
ample, is an album of MP3s less material than a CD? Does an email need to be printed on paper to 
become material? Is a computer worm such as Stuxnet immaterial? We have shown that these ques-
tions arise when we investigate IS phenomena from a substantialist perspective. We argue that it is not 
productive to define in advance of inquiry what the materiality of any given entity is. Rather, when we 
study the materiality of a certain phenomenon in IS, it is more useful and interesting to study how 
Hafermalz & Riemer / Mattering in the Network Society 
 
 
Twenty-Third European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Münster, Germany, 2015 13 
 
 
technology, and people through technology, come to matter in practice. This requires us to think of 
materiality as a relational quality, a practical accomplishment.  
A relational view allows us to overcome existing unhelpful distinctions that hinder our understanding 
of the networked society, such as the one between virtual and real. Under a substantialist view, the 
notion of virtual suggests that if an entity is not physical - if it does not have corporeal existence - it is 
not material. At the same time however, the notion of virtual or immaterial suggests that the entity is 
somehow “nowhere”, as it is present in the virtual but not in the “real” world. Our point is that the 
conflation of material and physical leads to unhelpful distinctions that in turn lead to these apparent 
contradictions. We suggest that these contradictions can be overcome productively from a relational 
view, because this view opens up a space for IS research to investigate the ways in which materiality 
is accomplished in new ways characteristic of today’s network society. 
Viewing materiality as an active accomplishment in the context of practice also creates new distinc-
tions, most importantly by disentangling the notions of materiality and physicality. Our view of mate-
riality does not deny physicality or dismiss the importance of embodied experience. Rather, we layer 
the (socio)material over this physical dimension, and point to the ways in which the two feed into one 
another. The way a phone feels in the hand is vitally important to how it is taken up in practice. But 
without the practice of phone use, which is always changing, the lump of smooth glass and metal be-
comes meaningless and immaterial as a phone. In this way entities are in a constant struggle for rele-
vance. If they do not matter in practice, their physical existence may also be jeopardised. For other 
entities however, it is this loose relationship with corporeality that makes them so successful, for ex-
ample cloud computing has a tenuous, fluid relationship to physicality, yet its presence is felt strongly 
in everyday work practice, to the point where workplaces are being physically re-designed to accom-
modate workers who are no longer tethered to desktop computers and mainframes. 
We therefore argue for a relational view of materiality, in which we understand entities as becoming 
material when they are implicated in and co-constitutively entangled with other entities in social prac-
tices. Rather than implicitly constituting a lack of physical presence as a problem when understood 
against the taken-for-granted “gold standard” of physicality, a relational view allows us to investigate 
the interesting and relevant question of the role of physicality in the accomplishment of materiality, as 
well as the implications of materiality for the physical world. In this view, “digital” is no longer an 
antonym for “material”. Being able to discuss the materiality of the digital in turn opens up a new vo-
cabulary for IS researchers that allows us to grasp more meaningfully the phenomena that are increas-
ingly relevant to our work. 
As we move towards an increasingly networked society we are in great need of effective tools to grasp 
emerging phenomena that are challenging our everyday understanding of the world. We have argued 
that this can only be achieved by bringing to the fore the taken-for-granted assumptions on which our 
commonly held worldview rests, even though such a gestalt shift in ontological understanding is diffi-
cult to achieve (Riemer and Johnston, 2011). As such, our paper stands in the lineage of and contrib-
utes to a broader debate that calls for new ontological approaches for the study of phenomena of or-
ganising with IT, most notably recent calls for a sociomateriality research orientation (Orlikowski and 
Scott, 2008).  
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